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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH
FLOYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROBER TS, G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the
Board of County Commissioners for Utah
County, and as the County Board of Equalization, and as individual taxpayers in Utah
County; HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah
County Assessor; ELWOOD L. SUNDBERG, as Utah County Auditor; MAURICE C. BIRD as Utah County Treasurer;
C. STEVEN HATCH, as a resident and
taxpayer of Utah County.
Plaintiffs, Appellants and Cross-Respondents,

Case
No. ll369

-vs. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant, Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

INITIAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT,
STATE TAX COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This matter is before this honorable court on appeal
and cross-appeal from a decision of the Fourth District
Court, Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge. It presents
iievcral questions relating to the validity of tax assessment procedures and particular assessments, and of intergovernmental relationships as between the Utah State
1

Tax Commission (hereinafter ref erred to as ''respondent," "defendant" and "the Commission") and the
county officials listed (hereinafter referred to as '' appellants," "plaintiffs" and "the Utah County Officials")
in relation to ad valorem valuation assessment and
taxation on a county level. The question arose in the
frame of reference of certain assessments based upon
appraisals made by the State Tax Commission in Utah
County, in cooperation with the Utah County Assessor,
as part of the Commission's state-wide cyclical assessment program. The case is framed as an action for declaratory judgment with relief sought for prospective
operation only, and has no executory consequence as to
any public instrumentalities or taxpayers.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a trial, argument and consideration of briefs
of counsel, the lower court on June 12, 1968 rendered a
memorandum decision (R. 145-153) and subsequently, on
August 15, 1968, signed amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and declaratory judgment (R. 187-199) iu
final disposition of the matter before it.
The lower court found some issues in favor of plaintiffs and some in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs appealed
011 September 3, 1968, and therefore are appellants and
cross-respondents, and defendant appealed on SeptemlJer
12, 1968, and is therefore designated as respondent and
cross-appellant for purposes of the hearing before this
court. In connection with its appeal, defendant filed a
statement of points (R. 215-A) pursuant to Rule 75 (cl),
2

U.R.C.P., to draw the attention of the court to the questiolls it desires considered on appeal and the type of relief that defendant considers would properly and with
finality dispose of the significant questions here involved
in the best interests of the public.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Commission seeks an affirmation of the lower
court's decision insofar as it relates to the matters raised
by plaintiff's' appeal, a reversal of the lower court's decision in relation to those matters brought to its attention
by the appeal and statement of points prepared by defendant; respondent also requests that the court exercise
its discretionary powers to wholly resolve certain problems herein involved, as set forth in Point IV of this
brief.
Because of the complexity of this case, its public importance and the desire of all parties concerned to expedite proceedings herein as much as is possible, both parties have simultaneously prepared and submitted initial
briefs dealing with the bases of their respective appeal,
and each subsequently may file responsive briefs answering the initial briefs. This procedure is adopted pursuant to stipulation of the parties and order of this honorable court signed by Chief Justice J. Allen Crockett
under date of October 15, 1968.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
'rlie facts in this case, in their proper legal and historical frames of reference, are of cardinal significance

3

m this hearing and will therefore be set forth in mor0
detail than is typical in a brief on appeal. The chronology herein involved logically breaks down into four different stages, which will be dealt with in order:
( 1) The V a2uations

In 1961 the State Tax Commission commenced a
cyclical reappraisal of real property (without improvements) throughout the state (Tr. 187-189). 1 Work was
done by the Valuations Division of the State Tax Commission and in cooperation with local officials. By 1965
substantial parts of Salt Lake, Juab and Kane Counties
had been completed, and work was commenced in Utah
County (and soon after in Grand, Millard and San Juan)
(R. 188). This work was commenced pursuant to a legislative directive:
The state tax commission on a continuous countyby-county rotation basis and in co-operation with
the various county assessors shall make a valuation of all taxable property in each county at least
once every five years. Section 59-5-46.1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
Between 1953 (when this statute was passed) and 1960,
one cycle of revaluation and assessment adjustment had
been completed in the state, but the record is not clear
as to the details of the cycle since there was a complete
turnover in county and Tax Commission officials between
1960 and the time of trial (Tr. 189, 233, 238).
i In the record in this case, the transcript pages are numbered separately from the remainder of the record, as are the multi-page exhibits.
References to "Tr." arc to the transcript of trial, "R." to the numbered
pages of the record, and the exhibits will be referred to by number.

4

Basic responsibility for land valuation and assessment in a county is that of the county assessor. Section
59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1963), provides in pertinent part:
The county assessor must, before the fifteenth
day of April of each year, ascertain the names of
all taxable inhabitants and all property in the
county subject to taxation except such as is required to be assessed by the state tax commission
and must assess such property to the person by
whom it was owned or claimed, or in whose possession or control it was, at 12 o'clock m. of the
first day of January next preceding, and at its
value on that date; ... .Assessors shall become
fully acquainted with all property in their respective counties, and are required to visit each sepa.ra.te district or precinct either in person or by
deputy, anrnually, arnd in person or by deputy arnnually to ~pect the property they are required
to assess. (Emphasis added.)
The law further requires that each year assessors
sign a sworn statement to the effect that they have inspected all properties and met these statutory obligations. Section 59-5-30, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1961). All assessors have signed such statements
yearly, in spite of the fact that they have not met these
obligations.
This default of county assessors generally and of
th0 Utah County Assessor in particular is clearly evidenced in the record (Tr. 185-187). In Utah County, for
example, valuations had not been updated for about
ten years prior to 1967, when the valuations which are
the subject matter of this action were placed upon the
5

rolls (R. 187-188). Even though the record suggests
that the assessors are not completely at fault since they
do not have at their disposal funds and trained personnel
sufficient to meet their statutory obligations, the fact remains that in Utah County (as in virtually every other
county in the state) locally-assessed properties have
been for years assessed at dramatically lower rates than
state-assessed properties (P. Exh. 3, Def. Exh. 11). As
will be elaborated upon in some detail in Point IV, this
situation is by no means unique to this jurisdiction but
is found in many states.
The Commission based its decision to come into
Utah County at the time it did upon four criteria, which
it considered in each determination as to where to send
its appraisal teams (Tr. 190-196):
1. CooRDINATION OF EFFORT. Experience of past years
has shown that the best quality of appraisal work, and
the most expeditious completion as well, is assured when
land appraisers work simultaneously with structure appraisers in a given locality. Structure appraisers had
gone into Utah County shortly before the land appraisers
were seut in (Tr. 191-192).

2. ROTATION. The Commission attempts to work the
various counties in an approximately cyclical order, hut
,-aries somewhat therefrom because economic conditions
may cause more rapidly growing disparaties in one county thm1 in others in any given time period. Exact rotational order will be deviated from when a pragmatic
analysis of nll c:ireurm;tances suggests that the problems
6

in one area are considerably greater than those in another
area whose "turn" it might otherwise be. Indeed, if
exact order had been followed based upon the prior
cycle, the appraisers would have probably been into Utah
County a couple of years earlier than they in fact were
(Tr. 239).
3. COEFFICIENT OF DISPERSION. The coefficient of disperson factor describes the quality of assessments within a given geographic unit. While the assessment level
reveals average level of assessment prevailing in a unit,
the coefficient dispersion factors show how individual
assessments within a given unit vary from that average.
rrlrn higher the coefficient of dispersion, the less satisfactory is the quality and the greater the deviation in
individual assessments from the actual average. The
coefficients of dispersion in 1965 in Utah County on city
and town lots were 35 percent and on urban lots, 33 per
cent. These figures are high and indicate considerable
lack of uniformity of assessment and taxation within
the county and approximate those which exsited in Weher, Box Elder and Cache Counties at that time, these
counties being the most seriously variant of those on the
Wasatch Front (Pl. Exh. 3, Tr. 192-193). 2
2 The coefficient of dispersion problem makes unfeasible a simple blanket
increase to a certain level, for example 30 per cent of fair cash value, based
upon a simple raising of the average assessment level. If, for example, the
average assessment level in geographic unit wa~ 15 per ce11;t but the coefficient of dispersion high - say 30 per cent - a simple doubhng ?f the assessment level would bring the average to 30 per cent, but result. m some taxpayers paying on the basis of 40 or 60 or 80 per cent <;>f fair cash value
while others continue to pay on an assessment substantially less than 30
per leent.
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4. AVERAGE AssESSMENT LEVEL. Where the average
assessment level is lowest, taxpayers are assuming a
share of the tax burden most variant from that assumed
by other taxpayers in the state and that they should be
assuming. In 1965 the assessment levels in Utah County were ·within a percentage point or two of the bottom
in the Wasatch Front area, throughout which comparable
assessment problems exist (Pl. Exh. 3). 3
The attention of the court is directed at this time to
a document in evidence entitled ''Assessment Levels of
Locally Assessed Real Property in Utah by Significant
Sub-classes 1967" (Pl. Exh. 3). This is typical of the
assessment level studies which have become increasingly
common in the various states in the last two decades and
are now prepared by the supervising tax authority in
most states. Because of these studies, the law in cases
involving discrepancies in valuation and assessment has
undergone a significant metamorphosis since World War
II, and the recent cases involving relief by mandate and
long-term systematic plans (see points IV and V) to
bring valuations and assessment levels into uniform line
had their genesis in these studies. 4
The great advantage of these studies is, of course,
that they enable a reviewing court to determine almost at
3 The four criteria have been set forth, not to defend the Commission's
decision to go into Utah County, which ~as discretionary and within t~e
power of the Commission to make, but simply to explain the manner m
which it was made.
4 As noted by Charles F. Conlon, Executive Director of, and Chief Counsel for, the Federation of Tax Administrators, and perhaps the most know!·
edgable and lucid contempo_rary _authority in this are~ <;>f the law:
.
A discussion of the JUd1nal impact of the adm1111strat10n of prope_rt)
taxes would be incomplete without some comment on the part winch
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a glance where a complainant stands in relation to other
persons, how the assessment level in one given geographical area compares with the level in other areas and how
the assessment level of one class of property 'compares
with the level of other classes. 5
The evidence shows (Tr. 90-91) that the County Assessor of Utah County in 1965, Mr. Guy H. Ivins, extended to the Commission his cooperation and support as
valuation work commenced in Utah County, even though
the actual participation of his office was limited.
The techniques utilized by the state appraisers m
Utah County included actual physical inspection of each
parcel of land, studies of appropriate sales data and
other relevant data, and consultation in relation to each
parcel with three local experts on the Utah County real
estate market (Tr. 217). In 1965 and 1966 all the city
and town and urban lots in Orem and all in Provo, exassessment ratio studies have played in this development. It seems to
me that without any question, the availability of (mostly) officially compiled assessment ratio data has more than any other factor persuaded
the courts that a departure from traditional procedures was warranted
in the discrimination cases, and that under some circumstances the
court should use its powers to order officials to observe the standards
laid down in the statutes and constitutional provisions governing the
assessment of property.
Assessment ratio studies have now become a standard tool in the
assessment field. They are conducted with some frequency in nearly
two-thirds of the states, and it is likely that the use of this procedure will
become even more common. Certainly, such studies are a necessity in
any effective state supervisory program. The Property Tax Today;
Impact of Recent Judicial Decisions in T~e Property T~x: Pro~lems and
Potentials, pp. 54-55, Princeton Tax Institute of Amenca (1961).
s Cases illustrative of the uses courts are making of these studies include
Townshi/J of North Bergen v. Division of Tax Appeals, 40 N .. 1: .super. 510,
123 A.2d 456 (1956), aff'd sub non; Town of Kearney v. Dzviswn of Tax
A/1/1,,als, 24 N.J. 90, 130 A.2d 845 (1947); People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf,
11/. & o. R. R., 22 Ill. 2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961); Kents 2124 Atlantic
.·hn1ue, 34 N. J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961).

9

cept a vt>ry small segment, were completed (R. 187). All
told, about 16,000 parcels were done. Since the values of
almoRt all parcels had lain dormant for several years,
drama tic increases in valuation, and subsequently in taxation, resulted. The average assessment level in Orem,
for example, for unimproved realty in 1966 was 10.16
per cent of fair cash value; after the new valuations were
placed on the valuation rolls, it was 19.77 per cent. Comparably, in east Provo the figures rose from 12.38 per
cent to 19.66 per cent, and in west Provo, from 10.66
per cent to 19.96 per cent (Pl. Exh. 3, p. 17). The Commission's efforts were designed to raise the assessment
level to 20 per cent of fair cash value as a part of the
CommiRsion's over-all program. This program also includes a plan to bring all structures in the state up to 20
per cent of fair market value by 1971 (the average is
c.urrently 18 per cent) ; state-assessed properties are
near the statutory requirement of 30 per cent at the
present time and personal property near 26 per cent.
The Commission's plan is to stabilize buildings and land
at or as near as possible to 20 per cent of fair market
valm~ and then bring them en masse to 30 per cent (Tr.
107, JlG-117).
The assessment levels of the various classes of property i11 Utah and in Utah County for 1967, after the valuations anived at through the reappraisal above ref erred to >Vere placed upon the Utah County assessment

10

rolls, are here tabulated (Def. Exh. 10, 11; Tr. 106-110,
156-158, 162) :
Average
Weighted6
Assessment
Level (All
Properties)

Buildings

Personalty

State ________ 12.60

18

26

28

30

22.02

Utah
County 15

19

26

28

30

21.38

Land

Utilities Mines

As will subsqeuently appear in this brief, respondent
deems these figures to be of extreme significance in this
case.
The record shows that the values of the various
parcels, once determined and agreed upon with the local
consultants, were placed upon the "house cards" in the
assessor's officei with the acquiescence of the assessor.
From there, they were placed by the assessor's office on
the so-called ''blotters,'' and the notices sent out in early
l!J67 to the affected property owners reflected these
values. No complaint or objection was made at, or prior
to, this time by any of the affected county officials to the
effect that the valuations were either in error or unconstitutional, and these values were placed in due course
by plaintiffs on the county assessment rolls, and over 95
prr cent of taxes ultimately paid in 1967 in Provo and
Orem on the properties in question were based upon these
values.
6 "Weighted" means that the percentages are wei~hte? according to the
total amount of property in each class in the determmat10n of the over-all
011c1age (See Def. Exh. JO, 11 for illustration).
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The lower court determined, however, that these
valuations were void as contravening the uniformity and
equality provisions of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3, of
the Utah Constitution. 7
The court also found that the reassessment work
being done ''did not or could not achieve or work toward
uniformity and equality'' of valuations and assessments.
The position of respondent is that this program obviously
did not achieve uniformity and equality (exact uniformity being out of the realm of possibility) but that it clearly worked toward the same.
(2) County Board Actions

Because of the dramatic increase in assessments and
the wide publicity and discussion invoked thereby, the
Utah County Board of Equalization received a great
many requests for equalization, both from individual
taxpayers and from groups representing numerous taxpayers (R. 189). They commenced their hearings, conducted pursuant to Section 59-7-1, Utah Code Annotated,
7 Much was made in the court's memorandum decision of the length
of time that has been consumed to date in the current cycle. The evidence
on this point is subject to a variety of interpretations, and any effort to
make a projection based upon work done to determine how long it would
take to complete the cycle must be an educated guess at best, but the court
apparently determined that an additional dozen years would be necessary
(R. 150) . The position of defendant is that this is a reasonable, but not
not the only reasonable, interpretation of the evidence,. that even if the
court's projection is correct the valuations should be sustained, but the estimate is probably somewhat excessive since that part that has been d?ne is
the city and town lots in the area in question, and these _are the most d1fficul~
and most volatile parts of any county. For example, m Utah County 32.6
per cent of the parcels have now been completed, which is only about 211z
per cent of the area but about !iO per cent of the land, based upon assessed
valuation in the countv (R. 188-189) _ Similar comparisons can be made Ill
the other counties wherein work has been done.
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1953, on May 31, 1967, and continued the same until July
Gth of that year (R. 189). On July 10th, they took the
final action in disposition of these requests for equalization, which is relevant to this appeal, the county minutes
for that date showing (R. 131-132):
Commissioner Roberts moved that the legitimate
Class I agricultural land in an agricultural zone
be assessed at an appraised value of $500.00 per
acre with other lands in an agricultural zone prorated according to class and also that agricultural
land not in a strictly agricultural zone but used
for legitimate farming be valued at $650.00 per
acre for Class I and with other lands prorated
according to class, seconded by Commissioner
Hinckley and passed unanimously.
Although the hearings proceeded beyond the June
20th deadline set in the controlling statute, 8 the County
Board did not request permission to reconvene beyond
that date as provided in Section 59-5-46(10), Utah Code
e 59-7-l. The board of county commissioners is the county board of
equalization and must meet on the 31st day of May in each year to examine the assessment books and equalize the assessment of property in the
county, including the assessment for general taxes of all cities and towns
situated therein. It must continue in session for that purpose from time
to time until the business of equalizing is disposed of, but not later than
the 20th day of June, except as otherwise provided. All complaints regarding the assessment of property where notice of the decision of the county
board of equalization thereon has not been given to the taxpayer on or prior
to June 30, and all such complaints not disposed of or decided by said board
on or prior to said date shall be deemed to have been denied on said date
and no notice of such denial need be given. And it shall meet on the third
Tuesday of January, February, March and April of each year, excep~ in
counties where the population does not exceed 2500 persons as determmed
hv the latest decennial census, it may meet only on the third Tuesday of
April of each year, at the discretion of the respec~ive board_ of county commissioners of said counties thus affected to equaltze valuations of personal
property, the tax on which has been collected under the provisions of ~ection
59-10-4, and failure of any such taxpayer to appear at the first me~tmg of
the board of equalization after assessment of his per~onal property ts m~de
Ii) the county assessor shall bar him from any reltef, and the valuation
plaLcd by the assessor shall stand.
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A11notat0d, aR amended (1959) (R. 189). In the absence
of such request, the Commission naturally did not extend
such permission.
Tlw lower court held that the board was inundated
with complaints, that it proceeded with due diligence,
that a quorum ·was present at all times and that the board
acted only on complai11ts filed before June 20 (R. 189).
Defendant does not challenge these findings, but does
assert that the court erred in finding (and in part inferring) that the board based its determination on sales
transactions and other valid criteria, that it endeavored
to make assessed values uniform and equal throughout
the county, and that it was not bound by the June 20th
deadline. Argument in relation to this will be found in
point V of this brief and in the responsive brief.
In connection with this phase of the events that led
to these proceedings, two parts of the record are of particular significance, and defendant directs the attention
of the court to these :
1. The minutes of the County Board of Equaliza-

tion (Pl. Exli. 8).
2. A stipulated exhibit (Def. Exh. 4) which sets
forth, in relation to each parcel of subject property, the
sPrial number, the owner of record, the original 196i
assessed niluation, the adjusted assessed valuation as
tlctermi1wd by the Utah County Board of Equalization,
the fiual figures arrived at by the Commission follmving
its n.•a;-:;sessnwuts, the dates of the controlling hearings
and t]1(' <·lnss of propprty (agricultural, residential, ck.)
of eael1 pared.
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Finally, it should be noted that the actions of the
Board of Equalization gave relief to only approximately
700 of the owners of the properties which were appraised in the Commission's program. Owners of approximately 15,300 of these properties paid taxes based
upon these appraisals.
(3) State Review

The Commission reviewed and studied the actions of
the Utah County Board of Equalization. Subsequent to
the events last described, and following several attempts
at informal resolution, the Commission, being of the
opinion that the County Board's actions amount not to
equalization but to an attempt at a substitute assessment
based upon unconstitutional and erroneous standards or
(more likely) wholesale disguised abatements, commenced formal rectification action. The initial step was
sending to each affected taxpayer, commencing August
30, notices of intention to reassess the subject properties,
and therein the Commission followed generally the procedure set forth in Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended (1959). Approximately 700 scheduled hearings were held in Orem and Provo for five days commencing September 11, and in almost all cases the taxpayer appeared to protest either in person or through
('.Olll1sel. On two of these days the director of the Prop('rty Tax Division of the Commission, Mr. Max H. Kerr,
~;at in for one of the Commissioners who had been called
out of state, but l\Ir. Kerr simply forwarded the information obtained to the Commission, and did not par15

ticipate in the decision-making process of the Commissiou, which was collectiYe in all cases (R. 190).
At the end of each day, the Commission sent a notice
to the Utah County Auditor to the effect that the questions of valuation were "taken under advisement" (R.
27-55, 190), and thereafter an investigation of each complaint, of ten including a physical inspection of the premises, \vas then conducted (Tr. 122-123). The Commission
determinations as to value, following their deliberations,
roughly followed the original assessments, but there was
some variation in 39.4 per cent of the cases. Immediately
following October 1, 1967, the affected taxpayers and
the county auditor were notified of these decisions
(R. 190).
The lower court found that these procedures were
Yoid because of the time lapse between the hearings and
the final redeterminations, and further, in part, because
.:\lr. Kerr could not legally sit as a hearing offiicer. 9
( 4) Judicial Proceedings

As it became obvious that there were questions
raised in the course of events set forth in the preceding
paragraphs that would require a court determination, the
9 The position of the Commission is that Section 59-5-47, Utah Code
A1111otatPd. as amcnclecl (1959) should be interpreted liberally to effectuate
the policy of the same, just and uniform assessments, and that the. Comrnissio11 in fact complied with the substance of this section and, m the
altci 11atiH', even if under .'lection 59-5-47 the Commission actions were defecLi\e, these are s11s1ainahle under the Commission's general powers and the
sp<'(ilic language in Se1 tions 59-5-46, Utah Code Annotated, as amende~
(ILJ'i'l). and 'ilJ-1-13, l1tJh Code Annotated, as amended (1961). (See Pomt \
in this brief. ;rnd Point Iii in 1espo11sive brief).
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Commission filed on October 11, 1967, in this honorable
court a petition for extraordinary relief., 0
At the same time this petition was being prepared,
a complaint (R. 3) was being prepared by plaintiffs and
was filed under date of October 6, 1967, in the District
Court of Utah County.
The Supreme Court denied the Commission's petition for extraordinary relief, and the matter was removed to district court. An additional petition for extraordinary relief was filed in district court (R. 59-65)
hy the office of the Attorney General on behalf of the
Commission, which is in some particulars similar to the
one filed in the Supreme Court, but this, too, was denied.
The district court heard the evidence and argument
and on June 12, 1968, issued its memorandum decision.
In the final paragraph thereof, counsel for the Commission was instructed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment (R. 153). No time limit was
set forth. Because of some unfortunate circumstances,
largely beyond control of the Commission and its counsel, including an inopportune lapse by the United States
Post Office, the court on July 29th, and without notice
to counsel for the Commission or the opportunity for a
, o This action was prompted by the Commission's feeling that the issues
were of such public significance that an immediate determination was desirable and that were the assessments of the County Board of Equalization to
stand a revenue loss of over $30,000 would result. The Utah County offitials, through their counsel, took the position at the hearing on this petition that no revenue would be lost, since corrected assessment notices could
be sent out if necessary following determination of the legal issues. Tl1;e
Commission did not agree with this interpretation of the law, and at this
point it appears that whatever the outcome of this case, the monies are in
Lllt lost.
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hearing, signed findings, conclusions and a judgment prepared by counsel for the Utah County Officials. Many
findings were made from the memorandum decision, others solely from the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiffs. No findings were based on the Commission's pleadings and evidence. .Motions were filed to expand and
balance these papers and some modification was made as
evidenced in the final documents, but most of the proposed changes (largely additions) were disallowed. 11

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RELIEF GRANTED TO PLAINTIFFS
IN DECLARING VOID THE ASSESSMENT
BASED UPON THE COMMISSION'S APPRAISAL PROGRAM WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE RELIEF TO GRANT TO THESE
PLAINTIFFS IN THIS LAWSUIT.
One of the significant questions in this case is as to
the standing the plaintiffs have in court to challenge
the valuations here in question; a closely related, and
1 1 "Ve recognize that it was wholly within the court's discretion to proceed in this manner and that the final documents signed are no less official
because of the rather bizarre circumstances surrounding their birth. We do
wish, however. to bring to the attention of this court the sincere belief of the
Commission that these are generally distortive of the court's memorandum
decision and tend to dwell excessively on these parts of the decision, and the
evidence on which such decision was based, most favorable to appellants,
and to slide rapidly through and often by those parts of the decision and
e\idence more favoraule to the Commission. Specifically, we are concerned
more about what is not in these documents than what is in them, and respectfully submit that under controlling Utah Jaw [(Rule 52 (a), U.R.C.P.;
see also Mendelson \'. Roland, 66 U. 487, 243 Pac. 798 (1926)] the lower
court should have made additional findings in relation to such matters as
the a\-eragc assessment levels of all classes of property in Utah County (and
probably thro11gho11t the stale as well), and the failure of the Assessor of
Utah Connry to inspeLt properties each year and keep assessments current,
even though the e\idc·ncc in the recorcl on these matters is uncontroverted. It
is rlwrf'fore particularly important that this court review the entire record
in its rlelcrmi11<1tio11 of tl1c significant questions involved.
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equally significant, question is to what relief, if any, they
nre entitled if their challenge is successful.
At the outset, it should be noted that a county, unlike a nation or a state, is not a sovereign, but a wholly
dependent entity empowered to exist by the state government which created it and enjoying only those powers
and duties expressly delegated to it by the creating sovereign. It follows that a county board of equalization
has no power except that specifically conferred upon it
by the controlling constitutional and statutory law. 3
Cooley, Law of Taxation, Sec. 1196 (1924); Fesler v.
Bosson, 189 Ind. 484, 128 N.E. 145 (1920).

It would appear that since a county board of equalization has no inherent powers, that if it had the power
to challenge an appraisal conducted by the state that this
power would be spelled out or recognized in controlling
statutory law. But no statute authorizes this type of a
challenge, and its inappropriateness is obviously evidenced when the following facts are considered:
1. Challenged are appraisals made by the state, originally with the cooperation of the office of the County
Assessor of Utah County, and these appraisals were
acquiesced in by the county and adopted by the county
in early 1967, sent out in its assessment notices, and
challenged only months thereafter.

2. There is no claim by the county that there was any
flaw in the appraisal technique and methodology employed, nor is there any evidence to the effect that there
were any errors in the appraisals generally or, indeed,
in any of them specifically.
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3. 'l1he challenge \Vas framed iu part in terms of assessment levels i11 other counties. \Ve submit that this
is elearly outside of the arena of proper challenge, just
as it would be outside of the province of a single taxpayer
to claim that he is entitled to relief because another taxpayer had a lower assessment level than his or in some
way was evading taxes. To suggest that assessments in
Orem must necessarily be invalid because they are higher
than those now existing in Huntsville or Vernal is not
only an invalid basis of attack, but irrelevant and meaningless.
Defendant is in a bit of a quandry in attempting to
deal with that part of the lower court's decision dealing
with assessment levels. It is pointed out that there is
a wide discrepancy in valuation in the state (undisputed)
and that the current cycle valuation program is taking
considerably more than five years to complete (also undisputed). To jump from these facts, however, to the
conclusion that valuations based upon recent expert appraisals, closer than older valuations to both the statutory standartl and the average assessment level (in compliance with the uniformity and equality requirements)
for all properties, are void, while assessments that have
gathered dust on the books for about a decade, more
variant than the challenged appraisals from both statutory requirements antl the average assessment level are
calid, is quite a leap; oue, indeed, that we are frankly
unable to follow. The court's decision relied on no line
of ease law for ::,;uch a massive voidance - we are unaware of tlw c,xisteuce of such a line - and, indeed,
counsel fur plaintiffs in hi::,; memorandum and argument
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offered no viable case precedent, or legal theory, for this
type of relief in an action between governmental
agenC;les.
The decision does not attempt to deal with a number
of pervasive problems implicit in the case, particularly,
(1) the fact that the voidance of the challenged assessments at least by implication validates pre-existing assessments, whose contravention of the constitutional requirements, seem both in terms of the statutory standard
and in deviation from the prevailing assessment levels,
was far greater than those struck down, and (2) what
specific curative steps need to be taken to insure perpetuation of the reassessment program, either as it now
exists or in the form the court feels it should have, and
(3) the relationship of the level of the voided assessments to assessment levels of other classes of property.
These will be explored in this brief.
The applicable constitutional provisions read:
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this
constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its
value, to be ascertained as provided by law. Article XIII, §2.
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all
tanO'ible property in the state, according to its
val~e in money and shall prescribe by law such
regulations as ~hall secure a just valuation for
taxation of such property, so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his, hers, or its tangible property,
* * *. Article XIII, §3. See § 59-5-1, Utah Code
A1motated, as amended (1961).
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POINT II
EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE REPRESENTED EACH OF THE AFFECTED
TAXPAYERS (AND WE RESPECTFULLY
SUBMIT THAT THIS IS A MOST DUBIOUS
PROPOSITION) AND WERE ENTITLED TO
THE COLLECTIVE RELIEF OF THESE
TAXPAYERS, THE ONLY RELIEF AVAILABLE UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH LAW
TO THEM WOULD BE A REDUCTION OF
SUBJECT ASSESSMENTS TO THE AVERAG E ASSESSMENT LEVEL FOR ALL PROPERTIES IN THE COUNTY, vVHICH LEVEL
THEY ARE ALREADY BELOvV.
Even if the court were to determine that the plaintiffs in this case had filed for and on behalf of each of the
700 protesting taxpayers, only one of whom (Steven
Hatch) is in fact a party to this action, or even if the
court determined that it were a class suit and in some
way the county officials could represent not just the 700
who benefited from their ruling but the other 95.6 per
cent of the 16,000 ·who paid at the higher tax rate (most
remote), the relief granted by the lower court would not
be appropriate. The logic underlying this contention is
made clear by a review of the case law in the area.
In the older cases, when an individual's property
was assessed at a higher percentage of its value than
other property, the aggrieved taxpayer had no enforceable remedy unless his assessm0nt was in excess of the
statutory standard. The courts recognized conceptually
his right to have all properties assessed according to
the statutory standard to insure equal distribution of the
tax burden, but offered no meaningful executory relief
22

matter how disproportionate his assessment might
!JP in relation to those of his fellows. 12
~no

This approach, depriving as it did wronged persons
oi' any meaningful redress, left considerable to be desired
from the point of view of equity. A general awareness
a rose that some effective remedy was needed, but it
would have to be one which would at the same time insure that each taxpayer bear his just and rightful share
of the tax burden but not prove totally disruptive to the
taxing process. Obviously, total chaos would follow if
ewry person who could show his assessment to be higher than that of another person could simply have his
asse8sment reduced to the lower level. This would also
not clo equity, since the person with the lower assessment
might have benefited by a mechanical or clerical error,
and the intent of the legislature promulgating the tax
law would thereby be frustrated, and revenues could
never be reasonably predicted. The case law came quite
naturally to a position that anyone whose assessment level required his assuming more than his share of the ad
vnlorem tax burden ·was entitled, upon proper petition
to a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, to have his assessnwnt reduced so that he would pay his fair share, and
that this fair share could be determined by reference to
tlie average or rnedian assessment level in the jurisdiction or taxing unit in question.
12 Typical cases reflecting this approach are City of Lowell v. County
Co111111rs. ·of Middlesex, 152 Mass 372, 24 N.E. 469 (1890); State v. Cudahy
Parking Co., 103 Minn. 419, 115 N.W. 645 (1908); ~oy~l Mfg. Co. v. Board
of Eq11alizatio11, 76 N.J.L. 402, 70 Atl. 978 (1908); aff d, 18 N.J.L. 337, 74 At!.
r,25 (JCl09); Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 757, 64 S.W. 193 (~901); and, as a con1u11porary anachronism, E. Ingraham Co. v. Town of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374,
1:12 A.2d 563 (1957).
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This coneept '.Vas firmly erystallized in the laudrna rk ('ase of Sioux City Brirl9e Cu. v. Dakota CowtfiJ,
:2GO U. 8. 441, GI L.E(l. 387, 43 Sup. Ct. 190 (1923). A
bridge had been assessed in tl1r State of Nebraska at 100
per cent of its value, whereas locally-assessed property
was being at the same time assessed at 011ly 53 per cent of
its value. The N elJraska constitution provided that tax
was to be paid on all property according to its value.
The local tax officials refused to grant the bridge company the requested relief of lowering its assessment.
The prevailing rule in Nebraska had been implementation of the traditional remedy above described which, of
course, for practical purposes afforded no relief at all.
rrhe Supreme Court of the United States, faced with
the Nebraska ruling and inconsistent rulings from other
states, noted jurisdiction and in an unanimous opinion,
·with Chief Justice William Howard Taft speaking for
the Court, ruled that the bridge company had a right to
its remedy and that local law enforcement officials were
obligated to secure uniformity of taxation between all
classes of property.
That aspect of the Sioux City Bridge case and the
cases that follow it which assumes compelling signifiance
in the iHstaut controversy, is the requirement that uniformity uml equality must exist not only within a class
of prop<~rty, but between all properties without regard
to class whenever the controlling constitutional language
requires uniformity of valuation and assessment, and
rnah·s no provision for classifieation of property for tax
purposes.

,\Iost of the cases ha\'e arisen because of practices
of local assessing officials in taxing one class of property
at a different rate than another. 13
The principle of law enunciated by these cases, that
where the constitution requires property be assessed ac(·ording to a standard of true value and makes no provision for discrimination between classes of properties, all
classes arc required to bear their share of the tax load
'
is not only sound law, it is also just and logically correct.
While it makes no sense for one homeowner to be discriminated against in favor of another homeowner, it
also makes no sense for a businessman to be discriminated against in favor of a railroad or an urban homeowner
to he discriminated against in favor of a farmer. The
constitutional standard in this state (see Point I) is
equality and uniformity of all properties in all classes,
1 l For example, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 214
l\lrl. 550, 136 A.2d 567 (1957), which struck down lack of uniformity between
1 ea! estate and inYentories; State ex rel Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax
A/>J>eals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908, cert. den., 379 U.S. 818 (1964),
wltich required uniformity among residential, commercial and unimproved
realtv; Chicago B & QRR v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 170
Nebr. 77, IOI N.W.2d 856 (1960), held that assessing locally-assessed propertv
<it a lower rate than state-assessed property is discriminatory and arbitrary;
in lJelligole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.W.2d 10 (1961),
the court struck down a classification system adopted by local boards of
a'sesmrs which led to assessment of different classes of properties at different
rates.
Sec also McLennan v. Undercof!er, Fulton Sup Ct., No. B-14129, August
:n, 1%5 (CCH Georgia 200-135), appeal dismissed, 221 Ga. 613, 14_6 S.E.2d
6'\r, (1966), supp. order, March 14, 1966 (CCH Georgia 200-146); Boise Com···1111i/\' Hotel v. Board of Equalization, Ada County, 391 P.2d 840 (Ida. 1964);
liur/1: \. !Jrac/1111an, 4 Ariz. App. 55, 417 P.2d 689 (1966); People ex rel Callalir11' 1. Gulf, l\I. & O.R.R., 8 lll.2<l 66, 132 N.E.2d 544 (1956); People ex rel
H11/i·rm v. Chicago, B. & O.R.R., 22 Ill.2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961); and
f:'!/1/11r \'. State Tax Coll/mission, 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1959).
-1 hete is a whole line of New Jersev cases to this point. See, for example,
lia/dwill Conslr. Co. v. E\Sex Coullty Bd. of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108 A.2d
5'!~ (l'l'i4), overruling Rowil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 76 N.J.L.
402. 70 At!. g:·s (1908), atf'd 78 N.J.L. 337, 7'1 At!. 525 (1909); Gibraltar Cor' "!',"led Pa/1er Co. v. Town sh if> of Nort/1 Bergen, 20 N.J. _213, 119_ A.2d 135
(i'l>'•); and the leading case in this line, Switz v. Township of Middletown,
~·l :'-: .J. 580, 120 A.2d 15 (1957).
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and not just within a given class, and controlling case law
1s consistent therewith.

In First Natio11al Bank of Nephi''· Christense11, :19
Utah 5G8, 118 Pac.778 (1911), the plaintiff bank i1woked
theo jurisdiction of the Fifth District Court to enjoin collection of a tax alleged to have been wrongfully assessed.
The District Court refused, and the Supreme Court upheld the District Court, ruling that the plaintiff had not
proven his claim of discriminatory taxation. In so ruling, the court left no doubt that Utah stands in the main
line of case law:
Inequality and lack of uniformity may result not
only by applying different rates of assessment,
but also from misconduct of taxing officers by
which property of one person, or a class of persons, or a particular class of property, is intentionally assessed at a valuation greater in proportion to its real or cash value than is placed on
the general mass of other taxable property.
That is, though the Constitution and the statute
require the taxing officers to assess all taxable
property at ''its full cash value,'' yet, should taxiug officers of a county assess real estate, livr
stock, merchandise and chattels at 60 to 70 per
cent of their actual or cash value, and moneys or
sliares of stock in manufacturing or industrial
0nterprises, or i1westments, at their actual or
cmih value, the assessment would not be eqnnl or
uniform.
Jn s11ch case, t71ose 11:lwse property was i11.feutio11ally assessed at a higher percentage or val11atio11 tlian was placed on the general mass of taxaufr 11ro7;erf.1J in tlie county may im•oke the aid of
<·011rfs to co1111Jd the taring offiC'Prs to reduce tli1·
1·.rc1·ss1rr assess11u'.1d so marle, to the same JJfO-

pnrtion of ralue as 11'a~ LJ1ocerl 11po11 the gel!eral
mas_s of other taxalJle prnpedlf in flte cn1111ty. A

demal of such right results in iner1uality and a
want of uniformity in the assessment and taxation. Linly v. 2\lissouri, K. & T. Rv. Co. of TPxas, 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 8;)2; Ra}-moncl v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52
L.Ecl 78; Taylor\'. Louisville & N. R. Co., 88 Fed.
364, 31 C.C.A. 537; 37 Cyr. 737. If, therefore,
plaintiff's shares of stock were assessed at a
value greater in proportion to that placed upon
the general mass of taxable property in the county, it is entitled to have that value reduced to the
proportion placed on such mass of taxable property ... specific instances here and there where a

lower valuation in proportion to the actual or case
value was placed on taxable property than was
placed on plaintiff's vroperty do not, within thernselres, furnish sufficient ground for compla.int.
To constitute such ground it rnust be made to appear that a greater valua.fion in proportion to the
actual or cash value was placed on plaintiff's
property than was placed on the general mass of
taxable property in the county. (Emphasis

added.)

These principles were reaffirmed in Continental Bamk
of Salt Lake City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 179 Pac.67
(1!119). The court there said:
The proposition is incontrovertible, that, under
the Constitution and laws above cited, taxation
should he uniform upon all property ·within the
jusdiction of the authority levying the tax.
The Rppraisals of lands in Orem and Provo raised the
an)ra{)'e
assessment level in this land substantially above
b
th<' assessment lenl of land in other cities in Utah Counh", hnt iwt up to either the legal standard or the average
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assessment level of all classes of property in the county,
as clearly set forth in the record (See tabulation, page 11
of this brief).
Some testimony was elicited as to the method of valuation of the classes of property listed in the tabulation.
Land, buildings and personal property all have active
markets and it is, therefore, possible to ascertain with
limited difficulty and considerable accuracy their fair
market value.
Utilities are valued m this jurisdiction and in virtually all jurisdictions according to a three-factor formula. There is slight variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the factors here (and generally) used a re net
book value of tangible property, operating income capitalized, and value of stock and debt outstanding (Tr.
156). This system has evolved through decades of evolution and is not fanciful or arbitrary, but is designed
expressly to reflect the fair cash value of utility properties and is the best possible empirical standard of measurement which has been discovered to value utility properties.14
Mines are valued according to a specific statutory
formula set forth in Section 59-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1963). 15
14 The record reflects (Tr. 156-157) that several years ago, an independent
group of experts tested our method of utility valuation. to d~ter~ine the
degree of error. After making a_ ~omplete an~ thorough mvest1gat10n, then
collecti,·e conclusion was that ut1ht1es were bemg taxed at a le\el of exactly
28 per cent, which precisely wrroborated the State _Tax Commission's own
figures. t-urther, the accuracy of this type of valuat10n procedure has been
1 ~wg 11 ized bv courts. Clticago B & Q R R \'. Stale Board of Equaltza/1011
and AHe.1.\111ent, supra.
1 s The legislature has ctetermincd that b~ application of this formula, _a
tax will be imposed upon mines 1cp1csentat1ve of 30 per cent ot the tan
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In summary, we suggest that even if the court assumes that the plaintiffs are prosecuting this action in
behalf of all affected taxpayers in Utah County - and
we doubt that this is a valid assumption - all the relief
tli ey would be entitled to would be the collective relief
tli cse taxpayers would be entitled to; i.e., having their
assessments changed to the arerage level of all properties in the county. Since the protested assessments al-

ready are below 21.38 per cent, the average level, it follows that there is no meaningful relief available.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING VOID THE VALUATIONS ARRIVED AT
THROUGH THE COMMISSION'S APPRAISALS, SUCH APPRAISALS BEING PART OF
A COMPREHENSIVE, SYSTEMATIC PLAN
TO MAKE TAXATION OF ALL PROPERTIES IN THE STATE UNIFORM AND
EQUAL AND CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION AL STANDARDS.
To state that plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief
sought (and in part granted), however, is not ultimately
dispositive of the basic problems involved. Inequities do
exist; some citizens are absorbing a substantially larger
market value. A unique problem exists in relation t.o valuation .of mines in
th;it. unlike all other properties, the asset upon which the tax 1s to be ext1 aned is hidden beneath the surrace of the ground and can be neither
q:1:\l.titativly nor qualitativeh measured wi~h any precision._ B.ecau~ of this,
fc11 nrnlas based on legal fictions are us~d m v1rtuallv a.11 iunsd1ct1ons, and
our lormula and others have been sustamed as const1tut10nal, and as resu~t
i11µ; in taxation which is in line with that of other classes of property, 111
se1cral courts of appellate jurisdiction.
In the context of the instant problem, however, mining assessment probk111s are not significant since mining properties represent onl)' l.2 per cent
ol the taxable prope1ty in Utah County.
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share of the state's reveuue exactions than they should.
The Commission has instituted a systematic program to
alleviate this condition; the solution of the long-term
problem depends upon the sustaining of this program
or the implementation of an effective alternative (see
Point IV).
There is a line of cases, mostly of recent vintage,
standing for the proposition that even though lack of
uniformity and equality in valuation are present, if a
systematic program is being followed leading to the correction of these problems, then temporary inequalities,
even if resultant from the implementation of that
program, will be overlooked in the interests of the
greater good that ·will result through the program.
The philosophy behind these cases is that in a multiple-year program, temporary inequalities will of necessity result, since those taxpayers whose lands have
been most recently appraised will be paying on a higher
assessed value because of inflation and other shifting
market conditions than the remainder of their peers.
Each year a different group of taxpayers will be thus
affected, and the inequalities will tend to even out over
the period of an appraisal cycle.
Recognized as among the leading cases are Board of
County Commissioners v. State Board of Equalization,
363 P.2u 242 (Okla., 1961), and eleven sister cases reported immediately following. The fact situations are
much like the instant case. The state taxing authority
determined that there existed a discriminatory situation
in that rural properties were assessed at a lower rate

than urban propc·1·ties, and ordered the rate of the former to be raised at a greater rate than the latter, in seeking to arrive at state·wicle uniformity over a period of a
few years. rrhe county boards n~fused to comply and,
issue l1eing joineu, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the state authority's position, even though temporary lack of uniformity was clearly present. The concurring opinion of Justice Irwin, quoted here in part, is
particularly instructive:
In my judgment, inequalities in valuations existed
within some counties and between the several
counties for many years before the State Board of
Equalization rendered its order. And in my judgment, the Order does not adjust and correct the
inequalities as it is apparent inequalities still
exist. However, the Order of the State Board of
Equalization did remove some of the inequalities
and is a step toward granting to all the taxpayers
their right to have their property assessed equally
and uniformly with the property of every other
taxpayer.
The question then arises: "Where the Constitution and the statutes provide that the State Board
of Equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuations, is an order which only tends to adjust and
equalize valuations valid 1''
The Tax Commission found in substance that to
completely adjust and equalize the valuations in
a single order or in any one year, "would create
an undue hardship on all concerned .... "
In my judgment, a reasonable and practical interpretation of our Constitution and statutory provision authorizes and empowers the State Board
of Equalization to render the Order appealed
from.
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In Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395,
71 A.2d 47 (1960), a statutory plan providing for a fouryear appraisal cycle in Cook County, Illinois, was upheld even though the court noted that complete uniformity did not exist in any single year. And in Rogan v.
Counly Commissioners of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299,
71 A.2d 47 (1950), a five-year program was sustained in
face of constitutional attack. The county commissioners
were required to follow the equalization directives of the
State Tax Commission, of which the appellant Rogan was
chairman.
A similar result was reached in Hamilton v. Adkins,
et al., 250 Ala. 557, 35 So.2d 183 (1948), cert. den. 335
U.S. 861. The court held:
Where there is a review of only a portion of the
real estate in the county done in good faith and
looking to a plan to equalize values of all property
as promptly as possible, this should be considered
on the question of intentional discrimination.
The fact that a reappraisal program results in very dramatic boosts in valuation in some areas while others remain untouched is in itself no grounds for invalidation.
In Wild Goose Country Club v. Butte County, 60 Cal.
App. 339, 212 Pac. 711 (1923), a precursor of the more
recent decisions above cited, after setting forth an excelent definition of market value (" ... not ... value ...
for a particular purpose, but . . . value in view of all
the purposes to which it [the property] is naturally
adapted"), the court sustained a ten-fold single-year
increase in valuation 011 some properties, while others
n•fl<:'cted no increase at all lweause there \Vas not suffi-

ricut time to adjust all in a single year. See also People
Y. On:is, et al., 301 Ill. 350, 133 N.E. 787, 24 A.L.R. 325
(1D21).
The lower court evidenced concern about the time
lapse. It is true that most of the cases involve programs
taking five years or less although in one, Bade v. Drachman, 4 Ariz. App. 55, 417 P.2d 689 (1966), a ten-year program was upheld at least by implication. vVe would re:,;pectfully suggest that more important than the time
question is the question of whether or not the challenged
program tends to promote uniformity and equity in its
over-all impact. Based upon this standard, we submit
that the Tax Commission's program should be sustained.
As a result of the reappraisal program conducted in
Utah County, uniformity of land valuation was achieved
within Provo and Orem, and assessed valuations of land
iu these cities were brought closer to the county-wide
<fferage assessment level of all properties. The quality
of prevailing valuations was substantially raised, as evidenced by the lowered coefficients of dispersion.
'l1here is another argument for sustaining the Tax
Commission's plan. A reappraisal program must start
somewhere, and if county officials could negate valuations
merely because they were made in that county and not
uhwwhere, the program would never get off the ground.
'11 0 create absolute equality, of course, all appraisals would
Jiayc to be made at a single given moment in time, which
is, of course, impossible. Indeed, in this jurisdiction, it
is also not possible to complete them in a single year,
and no statute contemplates completion in a single year.
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Co1w0ptnally, it is impossible to ever complete this type
of program, because of inflation and other economic
fiuctua tions. One witness, in fact, used the word "i11fii1i ty" (Tr. 148) in referring to the program's duration.
It is imperative, however, that continuous diligence be
applied to keep up as much as possible, and the record
shows that the Tax Commission is about keeping up in
spite of extreme limitations in moneys and manpower
(Tr. 199-200). The record also clearly shows that the
basic reason that the assessment level is out of joint in
the first place and the Commission called upon to set it
right, is the almost total default of the assessors of the
various counties. What the Commission has been doing
since the legislative mandate of 1953, in large part, is
merely cleaning up someone else's mess.
Further, sustaining the lower court's ruling would
have the effect of scuttling the only systematic and meaningful program now being conducted in the State of Utah
to bring land values up to the values of other properties.
Utah County ha8 no program to correct the inequities
·which now exist; indeed, all the evidence suggests that
the affected officials would be perfectly satisfied with an
infinite perpetuation of these inequities. This approach
might seem some·what mmsual in view of the clear and
cou vincing constitutional mandates, hut is in fact quite
common, the political realities being what they are (see
exploration of tho8e realities in Point IV). No county
in the state, in fact, has a viable program at th0 present
time to bring onler into assessment chaos aml insure that
all its citize11s are taxPcl equally according to the constitutional a11d satutory requirement8, and it is doubtful
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tlwt any county has at its disposal the means, manpower
arnl expertise available to even attempt such a program.
1'lw counties differ only in the degree of their cooperation in the Commission's program.
The court's attention is directed to one of the sevPrnl paradoxes in this case. The Legislature of the State
of Utah promulgated a law stating that the Commission
should complete cyclical state-wide assessments every
five years; but since that program has consistently refused to appropriate sufficient funds to make possible
m'en approximate compliance with its directive. The
record is clear that the Tax Commission has continuously
attempted to secure more realistic appropriations for
this program (Tr. 121), and has done as well as it could
in utilizing available funds in its county-by-county ap11raisal program. And now, because of the fact that the
legislature has failed to grant sufficient moneys to effectuate its own manifest intent, the Commission's efforts
to implement that intent and bring to pass compliance
with constitutional standards have been struck down and
declared void. It should be noted again, and stressed,
that the Commission's plan has been judged to be defi<'ient only in the time of implementation factor.
According to the most reasonable interpretation of
the evidence presented, the Commission has adopted
rnlicl criteria in determining where to send its apprais<'rs; has implemented these criteria without favoritism;
litrn employed qualified personnel; has conducted a program utilizing accepted mass appraisal procedures, ineluding study of available sales data, physical inspection
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of all the premises involved and consultation with local
experts in the various counties, and has made a substantial inroad into the problem. The Commission's program
for land valuation is part of a larger integrated program
to aehieve equalization among the various elasses of
property; the program has been carefully thought out
and expertly implemented.
It is impossible to exactly project the time that will
be required to complete the current cycle. 16
Finally, it should be continually borne in mind that
because of the criteria utilized by the Commission to determine deployment of appraisers, those areas most out
of line with the norm, and in the most centralized and dynamic parts of the various counties and thus most needing work, have been done and are being done (Tr. 206207).
The lower court, in its memorandum decision (R.
151) noted that it could not be said that the legislature in
view of this case would not make means available to the
Commission to comply with the law the legislature itself
i 60fficial documents prepared by the Tax Commission, however, show
that in 1967 the assessed valuation of all property in the state was
$1,612.084,938, of which $231,465,584 was real estate. Approximately
$106,000,000 of this real estate is in Salt Lake County. Since the record
shows that 45 per cent, plus 17 ,000 parcels (Tr. 198, 254) of this has been
completed and about 50 per cent of Utah County has been completed, when
these are added with the other percentages, a reasonable estimate is that
about 40 per cent of the land in the state, based on the value thereof, has
been reappraised in the curre:1t cycle. Based upon percentage of area or
number of parcels, however, this figure would be lower; we respectfully
submit, however.that neither of these is as meaningful as. an est.imate based
upon assessed valuation. A simple aueage percentage is part1cula1·Jy dis·
tortive, sinu· it would gin' comparable weight to an acre. of waste. land in
west Juab County and the acre in Salt Lake City on wh1d1 the l\ennecott
Build.ing sits. Somewhat mo1e 111eaning1 ul would be an estimate based_ upon
tile nu~ber of parn:ls, but this would still be of dubious import smce the
si1e and value of sud1 parcels would vaq enormous]).

:-rn

passed. rrhis observatio11 is sound, and there are
sea ttered encouraging signs that a greater degree of legisla tivc cooperation may be in the offing. This being
tlw case, it seems premature at this time to strike down
Utah County assessments the first year they were placed
on the rolls. Perhaps if these assessments had been on
the rolls for five years and Utah County residents paid
higher taxes for that period than the other citizens of
the 1itate, there might be some justification for this type
of relief; but the opinion itself recognizes the possibility that by 1971 - five years hence - the situation
may be substantially changed, and we would suggest
that to void these assessments based upon any kind of a
projection - when the record reflects both the fragility
and contingency of any such projection and the real possibility of an accelerated effort - is unnecessarily harsh
and clearly erroneous.
]1n:-;

POINT IV.
THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS DISCRETION IN THE CASE TO REQUIRE BY ITS
EDICT STATE-WIDE UNIFORMITY WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME, THE EXERCISE OF
WHICH DISCRETION WOULD BE ALTOGETHER APPROPRIATE AND IS RESPECTFULLY INVOKED.
The appeal made by the defendant to this honorable
comt includes not only a plea for reversal of certain
parts of the lower court's ruling, but also (framed in the
alternative) a request for this honorable court "to make
:-;nd1 further and additional orders, including the grantlllµ: of extraordinary relief consistent with the pleadings
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and e\'idence herein, as the court deems necessary, just
and proper iu the premises to affirm the validity of the
state->vide reassessment program of the Utah State Tax
Commission or to otherwise insure expeditious statewide compliance with constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the valuation, assessment and taxation of property" ( R. 209).
This language was included to bring before this honorable court a possibility for resolution which has been
employed in other jurisdictions with increasing fre(1uency when courts have been faced with the type of
question here presented. In a persuasive line of cases,
courts of general jurisdiction in various states have
simply ordered state and local taxing officials to bring
assessments in line with the constitutional or statutory
standard within a specified period of time. These cases,
in their essential thrust and philosophy, are very much
like f'ertain recent and highly publicized cases in which
courts have exercised their powers to insure enforcement of civil rights laws or effect overdue legislative
reapportionment.
It is recognized that this type of judicial interposition is extraordinary and only unusual circumstances
and questiomi of grave public importance justify the
type of relief here suggested. It is respectfully submitted, howt>ver, that such circumstances and questions arc
here abulldantly present, and this case is particularly
suited for that type of resolution.

Defemlm1t argued for this type of relief in the trial
ThP trial ccmrt <1i<l 11ot rule on the merits of the

]i(~low.
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argument but, noting that it could uot make such a ruling,
:rn:.;·gestocl that the relief might be considered hy a court
of laHt resort (R. 151). Defendant is of the opinion
that the lower court's restraint was probably justified,
nm1 in fact requested and argued for that relief for purposPs of this appeal. Defendant respectfully suggests
tlia t the question of this relief is properly before this
lio11orahle court, and that this court clearly has power to
grnnt it if deemed appropriate.
This court is a superior court of general appellate
jurisdiction, and as such possesses inherent powers,
''and the jurisdiction of such a court is not to be reHti·ided except by the unequivocally expressed will of the
legislature." 21 C.J.S. Courts§ 238 (1940). This court
has held that it is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdidion. National Bank of Hailey v. Lewis, 13 Utah 507,
±5 Pac. 890 (1896). Not only do we submit that this
honorable court has power to grant this type of relief,
hut that it could, in fact, do so on its own motion without
the urging of any of the parties here before it.
There are several reasons why this type of disposition might be in the public interest. First, it would
111we tho effect of laying the entire controversy to rest
hy solving the underlying problem. A narrow decision,
confined strictly to the Utah County facts will in no
sense solve the basic problem, which is statewide. It
wonlcl not end the inequities and discriminations now
rnmpant. Only a broad decision striking at the roots
of the problem would insure that all persons in the state
ill't' taxed proportionally to the value of their property as
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intended by the framers of the constitution and the le",...,
isl a tu re of this state, and only a broad decision would
extricate the assessors of the various counties from the
cruel quandry in which they now find themselves. Such
a decisiou, ultimately dispositive of the basic problem,
would also avoid a multiplicity of suits. 17
Another reason for a final determination of the ultimate and underlying problem by judicial mandate is that
the experience of sister jurisdictions is that it is a type
of problem that has proven most difficult to solve 011 political level. The type of widespread, systematic underassessment of real property, and particularly rural real
property we are here faced with is by no means unique to
Utah, but is generally found - and has for decades been
generally found - throughout the country. The explanation for this lies in the very obvious and direct correlation between low taxes and political success, and the
even more obvious and direct correlation between high
taxes and lost elections. The learned Thomas M. Cooley
dealt with this problem in his definitive treatise:
In general, the people submit to taxation as a hard
necessity; and as every individual is likely to be
impressed with a conviction that the laws seldom
or never operate with equality or justice, he is
also likely to be entirely willing to make his caRe
one that shall escape the heavy burdens. The tax
official is therefore expected to enforce the law
against a community, the members of which ex1 7 Defendant is now aware of two additional suits dealing directly with
this problem which have been filed and are probably headed for. th.is forum
unless the decision in this case fully resolves the controversy, and 1s mforrned
and believes that several other suits relating to assessment levels are now
being prepared.
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cuse to themselves an evasion of its provisions on
the ground that even then they perform their duties as nearly as do the others upon whom the like
duty rests; and will feel, if compulsory steps are
taken against them, something like a sense of personal wrong. The difficulty is complicated by the
fact that the officers who make the assessments
are chosen by the people assessed, and as the local
assessments are usually made the basis for state
taxation, their constituents will expect them to
make the valuations sufficiently low to protect
them against unfair assessments elsewhere. The
sense of official duty must be strong and the firmness considerable that can resist under such circumstances the pressure for some departure from
the strict rule of law; and the conclusive evidence
that it is not always resisted is found in the notorious fact that men who take solemn oath to perform to the best of their ability the duty of assessing property at its fair cash value are accustomed
to assess it at from one-fourth to two-fifths only,
excusing their disobedience of the law on the general disobedience of others. 4 Cooley, Law of
Taxation, § 1597 (1924).

It is clear, in light of the experience of other jurisdictions and in light of the monetary and personnel problems previously discussed, that to expect elected officials
( ai1d particularly elected officials in small, rural counties), and those appointed by elected officials, to make
:-;c•rious inroads on this problem which would lead to
<'xpeditious solution is something less than realistic. This
i:-; nowhere more vividly illustrated than in the resistance
of Utah County officials to the proposed increase in
rnlnes which precipitated this action.
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These pro bl ems, as they exist in this jurisdiction,
were explored in considerable detail in a broad historical
and legal frame of reference, and with cogent comme 11 _
tary, in an article entitled Property Tax Assessment aud
the Utah Constitution - A Taxpayer's Dilemma, which
appeared in the September, 1966 (Vol.1966-No. 2) Utah
Law Review. After examining the nature of ad valorem
taxation and clarifying a number of commonly-held misconceptions about it, author Denis R. Morrill came to a
number of conclusions which are particularly germane to
this controversy, and the article is therefore particularly
recommended to the court for its perusal.
l\fr. l\forrill noted that "statistics show that not one
taxing district in the state is complying with this law
[setting the standard of value for tax purposes]" and
that "the standard [of value] remains subject to the absolute control of the county assessor.'' He discussed at
some length the same type of political considerations that
concerned Mr. Cooley (evidencing that the basic problem has changed very little in forty-four years) and additional pressures on local officials to keep assessments low.
These pressures result from the state-wide levies, one of
which (the uniform school fund, the operation of ·which
is explored in defendant's reply brief) is very substantial, and certain government aid programs which make it
possible for a district or county to receive direct monetary benefits by keeping assessments low. The prohlrm
with such aid, not particularly significant at present iu
terms of moneys i1wolved hut with a great potential for
Jong-term mischief, is thus defined by l\f r. Morrill:
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" ... by a process of undervaluation the assessor
can project an image of his county \vhich is far
from correct, and this distorted image of the relatin• prosperity of the area is then usecl by the
graut-in-aicl agency as a lrnsis for the !.~Tai;t. In
this manner, when one county receives aicl which a
neighboring county does not. clue to the higher assessed valuation, lack of uniformity is indirectly
promoted. The county that pays the least amount
of property tax in relation to the fair cash value
of its property receives the greater amount of aicl
money. From this situation has arisen the practice of "competitive unclervalua ti on," each county trying to project the bleakest image possible in
order that it might receive a larger share of aid
funds. It should be evident that such a practice
does not promote equity."

:Jlr. Morrill's conclusions, based upon the most
comprehensive non-governmental study ever made of
Utah property tax practices and problems, are most enlighteuing:
The state legislature has long been aware of the
flagrant disregard of the law in administrat·ive
procedures but has done rery little to remedy the
situation. State tax administrators are keenly
cognizant of the existing problems, but their
hands are effectively tied by constitutional, legislative or political strings ... while practical politics pids pressure on local assessors to disobey
the law. (Emphasis supplied)

'l1he court's attention is now directed to the cases in
\\"l1ieh court of ultimate jurisdiction in the several states
lww ordered state and local taxing officials to bring asSPssments in line with constitutional and statutory stand··
n rd,-., within a given period of time. One of the earliest
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of these was Switz v. Township of Middleton, supra. A
key aspect of the holding of this case, and one which characterizes the entire line, vrns the retention of jurisdiction
by the court to insure that its mandate was properly
carried out.
In Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965 ), thr
opinion opens with this most arresting statement:
From all accounts the tax roll of Duvall County
for 1964 is a mess.
The court noted the constitutional requirement (Fla.
const. Art. IX, § 1) of "just valuation" and the statutory directive that property be assessed ''at its full
cash value.'' It then spoke of the ''enormousness of the
circumvention of the command of the constitution'';
and, after digressing a bit to comment on the difficultie~
of the problem involved, held that "revaluation and reassessment should be immediately accomplished.''
Probably the prototype of the cases in this line is
Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). In its
opinion the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the
existence and scope of the underassessment problem with
relation to local properties was "common knowledge."
After observing that the situation was getting worse
instead of better, the court held that compliance with
the constitutional stamlard must be achieved as of the
11ext January 1 (1966). All taxing officers were to be
held strictly accountable therefor. The remand to the
district court by the Supreme Court ordered the clistrid
ju<lge to direct the state revenue commissioner to "ad-
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;-;e awl instruct" all county tax commissioners of their
asseHsment duties under the constitution, of the scope of
the Supreme Court's opinion, and specifically directed
the district court to retain the case on its docket to insure
compliance. 18
'

1

The controlling constitutional prov1s10n ( § 172 of
the Kentucky Constitution) sets forth a "fair cash
Yalue'' standard for property taxation.
The State of Tennessee subsequently made a similar
ruling in Southern Railway Co. v. Clement, 415 S.W.2d
146 (Tenn. 1966). A particularly flagrant discrimination
waR here present since locally-assessed property was
asRcssed at 10 per cent of fair cash value and state-assessed railway property at 100 per cent of fair cash
value. The court issued a prospective ruling that all
aRsessments at less than actual cash value would henceforth be considered void.
In Hanks v. State Board of Equalization, 90 Cal.
Hptr. 478 (1964), a California District Court of Appeal
rrfused to issue a mandate to require all property to be
18 The Kentucky Legislature reacted to this decision by passing a law
which sets limits on revenue taken in, to insure that the assessment adjustments did not result in a financial bonanza for the various counties at the
expense of the taxpayers.

Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue J. E. Luckett made this comment
after the adfustments had been made:
It was probably a wise decision on the part o~ the court. - alt~ough
we didn't think so at the time - to order the Job done 1mmed1ately,
that is by the next assessment per~od: If more ~ime had b~en given,
strung out over a period of years, It 1s doubtful 1f a better ]Ob ~~uld
have resulted. There would have been a tendency to put off dec1~10ns
and stultify the whole effort through m~ss confusion and uncerta1.nty.
~lachiavelli was right - cut off the dogs tail all at once;, not a h_ttle
piece at a time. J. E. Luckett, '_'Experiment in Democracy, Proceedings
uf t/ 1e . . . National Tax Association, 1966 (Columbus, 1967).
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assessed ''in proportion to its value'' as specified in the
constitution of the state (Art. XIII (~ 7), but accomplished the same end in its insistence on a uniform fraction of that value for all classes of property.
One case on the periphery of this line is of particular interest, since it involves many of the same concepts
as the instant problem and arose in a neighboring state.
In Southern Pac. Co. v. Cohise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 377
P.2d 770 (1963), the plaintiff railroad sued to recover
taxes paid under protest, alleging discriminatory assessment. Its property was assessed at 89 per cent of
its full cash value, county-assessed property at no more
than 20 per cent. 19
After recognizing the validity of the plaintiff rail·way 's claim of discrimination, indeed ref erring to it
as a matter of ''public notoriety,'' the court made the
following statement:
The absent persons here are the other taxpayers
in the state and the counties affected. There (sic)
rights cannot be injuriously affected by a decree
of court in this litigation since they have no right
other than that the tax laws be administered as
written, fairly and without discrimination. Were
the ultimate judgment to go agai11st appellee, taxpayers would have no right injuriously affected
thereby for they have no right to perpetuate diRcriminatory acts by public officials even though in
a measure they profit therefrom.
The court noted that great financial havoc would result
hy simply refunding the railroad's taxes, stating that the
1 9 The constitution of the State of Arizona permits classification (art.
IX ~ 1), but the court noted that the Arizona Legislature had not 1m
pl;m'ented this language to establish classes and there was therefore no basis
for discrimination.
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8h1te's power to make refunds "does not extend to its
O\nt destructio11. ''
It is to be noted that most of these cases are very rere11t. 'rhis is clearly the ascendant approach to cases
imoking wide-sprea<l assessment and taxation inequalities an<l evidences courts becoming increasingly aware
- primarily through assessment level studies - of the
futility of stop-gap solutions.

Defendant is keenly cognizant that the question of
whether or not this type of order is to be issued in this
proceeding is wholly within the discretion of the court.
It is equally cognizant, however, that in all probability
only this type of order will be ultimately dispositive of
the basic problem here before the court and avoid the
necessity of the question being brought before the court
again and again. We submit respectfully that it is clearly within the power of the court to issue an order requiring taxing officials on state and local levels to cooperati\'ely bring the level of assessment throughout the state
up to the statutory standard within a reasonable period
of time, which would cause the legislature and boards of
county commissioners to make the means available to
bring to pass compliance ·with the court's mandate. In
defendant's opinion, three to five years >vould be a reasona lile period.

POINT V
THE LOvVER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE UTAH
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION COM47

PLIED IN SUBSTANCE \VITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 59-7-1, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1963), AND THA 11 THE
F~QUALIZATION ACTIONS TAKEN THEREAFTER BY THE STATE TAX CO~IMISSION
\VERE VOID BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 59-5-47, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1959).
These statutes define powers of the two goYernmental bodies involved in this action, and the manner in
which these should be exercised, and are thus part and
parcel of the problems relating to these powers which
will be considered in the responsive brief. It would,
however, not be inappropriate to summarize respondent's position at this time:
(1) Section 59-7-1, Utah Code Annotated (1963),
quoted on page 13 of this brief, is jurisdictional, and a
large number of the actions purportedly taken thereunder by the Utah County Board of Equalization are
fatally defective because of abandonment of the Constitutional valuation standard and failure to act within
the mandatory time period. The time problem could,
and should, have been solved by requesting permission
to reconvene.
(2) In its subsequent actions, the Commission complied with the substance of Section 59-5-47, Utah Code
Annotated ( 1959) (quoted in responsive brief), which
sliould be interpreted permissively and liberally in the
interests of uniformity of assessmeut and taxation, aml
the Commission's actions thereunder sustained.
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( 3) In the alternative, if the Tax Commission's
actiom; are not sustainable under Section 59-5-47, they
nre sustainable under Section 59-5-46, Utah Code Annotatc(l (1959) and/or Section 59-7-13, Utah Colle Annotated (1961) (both set forth in the responsive brief).
These problems relating to the procedural sufficiency
of certain steps in the controversy are clearly of lesser
import, ~when compared to the questions relating to the
r:·clical assessment program previously explored, but
arc hy no means insignificant.
CONCLUSION
This honorable court has a number of options in its
cfo:position of this matter. Because of the widespread
public concern in the outcome of this case, the compelling problems existing statewide in relation to property
assessment, the almost certainty that a narrowly-drawn
decision confined strictly to the Utah County problem
will result in this honorable court (and several other
courts) again facing the same basic questions, the desirability of finally laying the problem to rest, and the
difficulties inherent in alternative avenues of solution,
we respectfully urge the court to fully exercise its powc·rs in resolution of that part of this case which deals
with the Commission's state\vide reassessment program
a11cl the discrepancies in assessment levels to bring to
pass nniformity in assessment and taxation in order that
no citizen of the state be further required to assume
a lnrger share of the general tax burden of the state than
i:~ justly his.
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This type of disposition would be iu complete harmony with the pleadings and the evidence. This action
was framed in terms of declaratory judgment law, which
grants broad discretionary powers to fully lay to rest
existing controversies. That law has ''its purpose ...
to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and [it] is to be liberally construed and administered." Section 78-33-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
See also Sections 78-33-5 and 78-33-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The public issues here involved far transcend any
partisan question as to who "wins" and who "loses";
the interest of all parties to this case, and indeed of all
Utahns, in an efficient and equitable tax administration
is common. We respectfully urge this honorable court
to keep these considerations uppermost at all times, and
make that disposition of the case that would best insure
just, uniform and efficient administration of ad valorern
taxes throughout the state. vVe further respectfully suggest that this disposition would be to find generally on
the salient issues in favor of the respondent State Tax
Commission.
Respectfully submitted,
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1\L R:BJED HUNTF~R
Assistant Attorney General
Sh1te Capitol Building
Attorne!JS for JJefewlauf
:JO

